The Light at the End of the Tunnels: How to Resolve the Israel/Hamas War

There is a clear path to resolving the Israel/Hamas war — a path that allows each side to achieve its major war objectives, albeit not the maximalist aspirations of either.

What are those major war objectives?

Israel insists on:

• the release of all hostages, including the remains of dead hostages;
• an end to all rocket fire, terrorism, and military assaults from Gaza;
• destruction of the tunnels and infrastructure that facilitate such lethal activity; and
• the defeat of Hamas, so that attacks from Gaza cannot recur.

Hamas demands:

• the repatriation of a large number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel;
• the end of Israel’s military offensive;
• withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Gaza;
• an end to Gaza’s humanitarian crisis; and
• the physical restoration of Gaza, which has been decimated, and the return of Palestinians to their communities and institutions there.

Thus far, the negotiations have focused on the first of each side’s priorities. American and Qatari intermediaries have doggedly pursued a hostage–for–prisoner exchange, enabled by a ceasefire (or “pause” in the more elegant phrasing of the diplomats). Their theory seems to be that, once such a transaction is completed, the ceasefire will become permanent, and voila! the war will be over.

But that is a fantasy. If trading hostage Israelis for imprisoned Palestinians were the only issue, this conflict would have been resolved long ago. Israel and its Palestinian adversaries have been down this road before and have been able to negotiate such a swap, even when the numbers were disproportionate.

The most dramatic example was the 2011 trade of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, after five years of captivity by Hamas, in exchange for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners. Several other large-scale, disproportionate exchanges have occurred over the years.

Press reports suggest that negotiators have frequently come to the brink of such an agreement resolving the current hostage crisis. But the deal always aborts at the last minute.

Why? For two reasons:

First, because Hamas — desperately holding on against Israel’s assault — regards the hostages as its last defensive barrier. It won’t release them as long as Israel continues the fight to destroy it. In Hamas’s calculation, even a full ceasefire is insufficient if Israel retains control of Gaza and thus can resume its attack once the hostages have been returned.

Second, a hostage release, however fervently desired, does not achieve Israel’s other primary objective of eliminating the threat of Hamas’s terrorist attacks from Gaza. Israel will not stop its offensive until that objective is accomplished.

In short, Hamas will not settle unless it can exclude Israel from Gaza, and Israel will not settle unless it can exclude Hamas from Gaza. The result is deadlock, and a continuation of the bloody conflict.

Accordingly, the current hostage/prisoner swap negotiations are an illusion. So too is all the discussion about a ceasefire — temporary or permanent. No matter how tantalizingly close this dialogue comes to an accord, the war will not end unless these other reciprocal, seemingly intractable issues are solved.

But there is a solution, based on historic precedent.

In 1982, responding to numerous attacks, Israel invaded Lebanon and advanced to the outskirts of Beirut. There it surrounded its long-time nemesis Yasser Arafat and his PLO forces. Led by hard-right prime minister Menachem Begin, Israel was determined to eliminate its enemy. However, to do so would have required severe fighting in a densely populated area, causing very heavy civilian casualties.

World leaders strongly opposed such an operation, and the closer Israel came to launching a final attack, the more world public opinion turned against it. Even Ronald Reagan, America’s staunchly pro-Israel President, was outspoken in his opposition and threatened sanctions against Israel. Notwithstanding its intense desire to destroy Arafat and the PLO, and its need to do so as an urgent matter of self-defense, Israel could not withstand this severe pressure.

For its part, the PLO — though desperate to avoid the annihilation that surely awaited if it refused to surrender — was unwilling to accept the humiliation and political demise that would result from doing so. Hence, the parties were deadlocked and headed to a bloody encounter.

Sound familiar?

But that seemingly insurmountable problem was resolved by agreement, brokered by US diplomacy. Shielded by an international force, and with Israel’s acquiescence, Arafat and thousands of PLO fighters withdrew from Lebanon to a safe haven in Tunisia, where they took permanent refuge. Meanwhile, Israel made a reciprocal withdrawal from Lebanon.

Despite the skepticism of many, Arafat never returned to Lebanon. On the contrary, he somewhat moderated his approach and went on to participate in the Oslo Accords and the Camp David Summit. But that is a subject for another day and another article. The point is that the 1982 deal held and the Lebanon siege ended.** 

Like all historic analogies, this one is certainly not perfect. Nevertheless, the 1982 precedent offers a road map for resolving the current Israel/Hamas war. Such a resolution would consist of two simple, reciprocal elements:

• Hamas, its allies and its forces withdraw to Northern Africa, Qatar or Turkey — where they will have neither the proximity nor the autonomy to launch attacks against Israel.
• Israel withdraws all its forces from Gaza, which it will have no incentive to occupy or attack further in light of the Hamas withdrawal.

These steps must be coupled, of course, with a hostage/prisoner exchange and a permanent ceasefire, neither of which is achievable now but both of which can be achieved once there is a mutual withdrawal.

From Israel’s point of view, this solution achieves its two main objectives: return of the hostages and elimination of the terrorist threat from Gaza. Granted, some Israeli leaders would prefer to see Hamas destroyed, not just evicted and eliminated as a threat. But, after extended warfare, it is clear that destruction of Hamas is not a realistic objective. Indeed, senior Israeli military figures have publicly said as much. Moreover, the very act of seeking it would result in an unacceptable level of international isolation of Israel, irreparably damage the US-Israel relationship, and end the opportunity for an historic Israel-Saudi rapprochement — while causing enormous suffering to the Palestinians, not to mention the deaths of more IDF soldiers. And even if successful, destroying Hamas would accomplish nothing more than evicting it would accomplish.

Of course, such an agreement would end Israel’s presence in Gaza, but Israel has no interest in remaining there. It demonstrated as much by withdrawing every soldier and every settler in 2005 and remaining away for the next 19 years, until Hamas’s October 7 invasion. No Israelis — except for a few irrational extremists — desire to return.

From Hamas’s point of view, such an agreement allows it to oust Israel from Gaza, end the carnage and humanitarian crisis there and obtain the release of a large number of Palestinian prisoners — a political success even though a military defeat. And, not incidentally, it allows Hamas’s leaders to save their skins.

True, Hamas would have to accept the end of its control over Gaza, but that has already happened. Control over an entity of 2.3 million people cannot be exercised — and is not being exercised — by a handful of self-proclaimed leaders cowering deep in underground tunnels in Rafah, or, for that matter, looking on wistfully from luxury dwellings in Doha.

Of course, steps must be taken to prevent a post-settlement return of either side to Gaza, which raises the frequently asked and never before satisfactorily answered question: What happens the day after?

The answer is that, for a number of years, Gaza will have to be administered by a substantial peace-keeping force. Who will be the peace-keepers? They will have to be forces from the European Union and the Arab League. Not from the hopelessly corrupt and incompetent Palestinian Authority, which is anathema to Israel, Hamas and, it seems, most Palestinians. Not from the United States, which would become a target, and whose presence there would become a political football back in America. And certainly not from the United Nations, about which nothing further needs to be said.

Would the EU and the Arab League be willing to undertake this role? Unclear. But if the package is acceptable to the combatants, there is reason to hope that the countries in these two entities — who have loudly insisted on an end to the conflict — would feel obligated to put their money where their mouths are, so to speak.

The Gaza peace-keeping force would do the following:

• serve as a trip wire against the return of Hamas or Israel forces to the Strip;
• oversee the reconstruction of Gaza, financed by the EU, Arab League, UN, US, Israel, Palestinian tax revenues and various NGOs;
• preserve order and supervise normal governmental functions;
• destroy the Hamas tunnels and military infrastructure;
• oversee the borders;
• demilitarize Gaza; and
• supervise periodic Israeli visits to inspect the above.

After several years, upon completion of the above, when Gaza returns to normal, the peace force will oversee elections (from which Hamas, if it still exists, would be excluded), transfer authority to a demilitarized, terrorist-free civilian government, and depart.

A resolution of the Gaza war along these lines would be a godsend for the Palestinians. It would enable them to rebuild, free them from the tyranny of Hamas, and end the burden of Israel’s defensive blockade. It would allow them to put aside their futile, endless, obsessive confrontation with Israel and build a democratic, prosperous entity.

Beyond that, such a resolution would end the violence and destruction and bring much-needed stability to the region.

Of course, a resolution along these lines certainly would not end all the other violence in the Middle East or even conclude the Israel-Palestine conflict. The West Bank, settlement issues, Hezbollah, Iranian threats, disagreement about Palestinian statehood — all these issues would remain, none would be solved. It is impossible to settle every or even most regional controversies in one package.

But, as was famously said decades ago about other issues, let us begin.